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I. Introduction
For a number of reasons, I was deeply honored and delighted to
have been invited to deliver this Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lec-
ture. In the first place, it is a privilege to be associated in this way
with a remarkable and beloved member of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia. He was a creative judge who used the law to protect the indi-
vidual citizen. That the law should be so used would seem obvious to
most intelligent people. Yet, frequently the law itself can become a
limiting factor in enabling rights to be exercised. The line between
* This lecture was presented as Hastings College of the Law on January 18, 1995.
The Mathew 0. Tobriner Lecture, in Honor of Justice Mathew Tobriner of the Supreme
Court of California, was established by close friends and relatives of the Justice to serve as
a memorial to him and his life's work.
** Justice, Constitutional Court of South Africa; Prosecutor, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Balkan States and Rwanda; B.A., 1959, L.L.B. cum laude, 1962, University
of the Witwatersrand.
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judicial activism, so necessary to ensure that the law and morality co-
incide, and judicial positivism, is a difficult one to draw. The activists
on any judicial bench become controversial and will be accused of
usurping the legislative function. The positivists will tend to tread
safer paths and be less in the public arena. A good judiciary requires
both kinds of judges. Too many activists would make the law, at best,
uncertain and, at worst, capricious. Too many positivists would make
the law static and unable to cope with a changing society.
Justice Tobriner, by all accounts, chose the more difficult path.
His guide to the law, to quote the words of Professor Lawrence Tribe
was: "the commitment to justice-to freedom, equality, and commu-
nity." That his family and friends established this memorial to him in
association with Hastings College of the Law is a manifestation of the
esteem in which Justice Tobriner was held.
I also feel privileged in having this association with the law school
and the opportunity it has given to me to meet with its faculty and
students. I need hardly add how honored I am to join the list of emi-
nent jurists who have delivered past Mathew 0. Tobriner lectures.
H. Past reatment of Human Rights Abuses
In the second half of the twentieth century, many countries have
moved from repressive regimes to democratic governments. The
causes of these changes have varied greatly. After the Second World
War it was a consequence of the defeat of Nazi Germany. More re-
cently, in Europe it has been the dismemberment of the Soviet Union.
In South Africa it has been the victory of the anti-apartheid move-
ment. In South America it has been the inability of military regimes
to contain the demands for civil government.
In all of these countries the forces which led to change were com-
plex and were both political and economic. However, there was one
problem common to the emergent democratic societies: the problem
of how to deal with those former leaders and their collaborators who
were responsible for past human rights abuses. Were they to be pun-
ished or were they to be granted immunity? Was justice to be granted
or denied to the victims? Was the very stability of a new and fragile
democracy to be threatened by the endeavor to publicly record and
acknowledge the past?
The abuses of the old regime were frequently perpetrated in se-
crecy and even when they were not, those really responsible denied
the events themselves or at least their own complicity with regard to
them.
The demand by victims for justice is a common human trait and
governments ignore it at their peril. If justice is denied, then victims
in many cases will seek their own revenge. They will take the law into
their own hands. Where past human rights abuses have been egre-
gious and have occurred over a long period of time, the call for justice
and in its absence, revenge, are all the more persistent.
The choices facing a new democratic government are:
1. To grant immunity or indemnity for past criminal acts;
2. To allow a regular justice system to operate and for ordinary
courts to try and sentence any persons proven guilty of crim-
inal conduct prior or subsequent to the transition to
democracy;
3. To establish a truth and reconciliation commission or its
equivalent in order to enable confessions of guilt for past
human rights abuses to be traded for indemnities; and
4. A modified form of truth commission where the most seri-
ous offenders remain subject to loss of office or even
prosecution.
It is instructive to consider the experiences of some countries
which have adopted one or other of these options.
A. Denmark
During the Nazi occupation of Denmark, a number of Danes, for
various reasons, collaborated with the occupiers. A few did so out of
conviction. Many did so out of fear. Whatever the reason, after the
installation of the first post-war government, two significant steps
were taken by the Danish Parliament. First, the principle of nulla
poena sine lege' was abandoned to the extent of retroactively criminal-
izing acts of collaboration committed during the occupation. Second,
the death penalty, which had been abolished in 1930, was reintro-
duced. These drastic steps were taken in response to tremendous pub-
lic demand.
Other occupied countries had governments in exile which passed
laws making collaboration with the Nazi occupiers a punishable of-
fence. Post-war governments ratified those laws and so avoided the
appearance of retroactive legislation. In Belgium, the highest civil
supreme court upheld the validity of the laws made by the govern-
ment in exile.
The purges, executions, stripping of social rights and other pun-
ishments which followed Nazi occupation in the 1940s are not well
1. Meaning, "no punishment without law." BLAcK's LAW DicrIONARY 1044, 1215,
1315, 1556 (4th ed. 1968).
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remembered. It may well deserve new research in an endeavor to de-
termine the part it played in the redemocratization of those countries.
B. Australia
In the aftermath of World War II, hundreds of thousands of Eu-
ropean refugees were given refuge in Australia. Unknown to the au-
thorities, amongst them were a substantial number of Nazi officers
and collaborators. Some were identified in the early 1950s, and calls
were made for the Australian government to investigate and charge
the suspects as war criminals. The government of the day decided that
it was time for reconstruction and reconciliation and that bygones
should remain bygones. The calls from victims for justice went un-
heeded and remained muted for the following thirty years.
In 1986 a number of alleged Nazi war criminals were identified
and became the subject of media interest. Renewed calls for investi-
gation and war trials were made and mounted. This time political con-
siderations moved the government to set up a war crimes investigation
unit and to change domestic legislation to permit jury trials in the or-
dinary criminal courts of Australia. The unit was given substantial re-
sources and competent investigators. They travelled all over the
world, including Eastern Europe, in search of evidence and witnesses.
Over 840 cases were investigated and eventually three indictments
were issued. One was withdrawn when the accused suffered a heart
attack. A second was dismissed following a preliminary hearing when
aged Ukrainian witnesses were too ill to travel to Australia or to give
evidence. The third resulted in an acquittal from the jury. In other
cases it was far too late for successful prosecution. Essential witnesses
had died years before and those who were still alive were in their 80s
and 90s and memories had faded and were unreliable. Proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt was no longer possible, notwithstanding
the best efforts of the war crimes unit. Nonetheless, the good faith of
the Australian government and the resources it gave to the investiga-
tion unit satisfied those who had called for its creation. The lesson to
be drawn from that reaction should not be overlooked.
C. Yugoslavia
In consequence of World War II, some 1.7 million Yugoslavs lost
their lives-about ten percent of the total population. The largest
number were civilians. At one death camp 100,000 were murdered.
Not one criminal trial followed. There were a number of revenge
murders. With one later exception there was immunity.
The exception was the case of Alojzije Stepinac, the Archbishop
of Zagreb who ardently supported the pro-Nazi Ustasha forces and
welcomed the independence of Croatia granted by Germany in 1941
as "a gift from God." He and many of his fellow priests, including
Archbishop Saric of Sarajevo, continued to support the pro-Nazi
forces in full knowledge of the massive scale killings of Serbs in
Croatia.
It was only in September 1946 that Tito put Stepinac on trial. The
real crimes of which he was guilty would have incriminated too many
other Croatians. It was a political trial, the main charge being that
Stepinac welcomed the Ustasha government while Yugoslavia was still
at war. After a long trial he was sentenced to sixteen years in prison.
He served five years, refused to go into exile, and was thereafter kept
under house arrest until his death in 1960.
One is compelled to wonder whether the circle of violence in Yu-
goslavia might have been halted if the terrible war crimes committed
during World War II had been publicly exposed and the most guilty
punished.
D. South America and Africa
It was a new form of terror that was introduced first in Guate-
mala in 1966-"disappearances." People were not killed by officials
or at identifiable places, such as police stations, military headquarters,
or death camps. They were kidnapped, tortured, and killed in se-
cluded places by people who wore no uniforms. The sole purpose of
the torture was to obtain information leading to the next series of dis-
appearances. The purpose of the disappearances was to sow terror in
the population, thereby ensuring obedience. A by-product was unac-
countability and deniability on the part of the military leadership.
Disappearances became an international human rights concern in
the mid-1980s. The first important investigation was the National
Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances, established in October
1982 by the government of President Zuazo of Bolivia. Eight commis-
sioners were drawn from across the political spectrum. However, its
mandate was restricted and its resources meagre. One hundred fifty-
five disappearances were investigated. Americas Watch described the
initiative positively:
A single outcome of the process is that the search for truth and
justice has been recognized, not only as a legitimate endeavor of
human rights organizations, but as an obligation of the state.
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However, it was the truth commission in Argentina which was the first
to receive international attention. Argentina's military rulers could
not hold onto power in the aftermath of their Falklands adventure.
Before they agreed to step down in favor of a new democratically
elected government, they granted themselves amnesty. In his elec-
tion, campaign President Alfonsin undertook not to recognize the am-
nesty law, and after he was elected, he set up a truth commission to
investigate past human rights abuses. He called it the "National Com-
mission on the Disappeared." Both chambers of Congress nominated
the ten commissioners who were chosen for their consistent support
for human rights. The chairman was the author, Ernesto Sabato.
The Commission investigated 8,960 cases, and its report, called
"Nunca Mas" (or "Never Again"), was widely circulated in Argentina.
A two hour documentary based on its contents was broadcast on na-
tional television. Prosecutions followed. Two past presidents and mil-
itary leaders were put on trial. When prosecutions were threatened
against the middle ranks of the military, there was a threatened coup
and the prosecutions were called off. That was a lesson taken to heart
throughout South America.
An unsuccessful attempt to expose the past in Uruguay then fol-
lowed. The mandate given to the Uruguay truth commission was lim-
ited and it was given grossly insufficient resources. (A similar fate
followed in Zimbabwe, Uganda and the Philippines for the same
reasons).
I come now to Chile. In March 1990, President Aylwin came to
power. However, he shared his power with the military which until
then had ruled alone. Aylwin appointed a "National Commission for
Truth and Reconciliation." Its mandate was limited to the investiga-
tion of deaths and disappearances. Its independent commissioners
worked with commendable and unusual speed. In barely nine months
they thoroughly investigated 3,400 cases. One of its most impressive
commissioners, Jose Zalaquet, delivered the Tobriner Memorial Lec-
ture two years ago. Over the past year he has also played a construc-
tive role in South Africa as it grapples with its own past.
The Chilean Commission regarded as its primary role the deter-
mination of what had happened. Through investigation of these cases,
it succeeded in its mission. Its report was made public in February
1990, and in a television broadcast, President Aylwin apologized on
behalf of the state for the human rights abuses committed by his pred-
ecessors. However, the public debate that followed was short-lived.
Three political assassinations halted it. President Aylwin's govern-
EXPOSING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
ment, nevertheless, carried out many of the recommendations of the
commissioners. In particular, it created the "National Corporation for
Reparation and Reconciliation," which was given adequate funding
and was able to operate effectively. By all accounts, the Chilean Com-
mission materially assisted that nation to put an unhappy past behind
it and allow its people to get on with building a better future.
In El Salvador, a bitter civil war left the country divided. The
peace accords, unusually, provided for the United Nations to create a
commission to investigate serious acts of violence that occurred after
1980. The U.N. was able to do its work and in its report, it named
over forty people found responsible for serious violations of human
rights. The Salvadorian military rejected the report as illegal and
within five days of its release, a general amnesty was passed by the
legislature.
Yet, another kind of truth commission was set up for Rwanda in
1992. It consisted only of members of international non-governmental
organizations. It was mandated in terms of an agreement, the Arusha
accords, which was part of the transitional peace agreement between
its two main tribal groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi. The report
achieved wide publicity both inside and outside Rwanda. It uncov-
ered many human rights abuses. It had an immediate effect on the
policies of the two European powers most involved in Rwanda,
Belgium and France. Any further or lasting effect was unfortunately
preempted by the eruption of genocidal violence which overtook the
country in April of last year.
A truth commission in my own country, South Africa, has been
the subject of a major debate during the past two years. It is very
tempting for the Government of National Unity, to put the past be-
hind it and to get on with building a democratic, non-racial society.
That was understandably the stance of the previous governing party of
Mr. F.W. de Klerk. Obviously, it was also the demand of the security
forces, in the ranks of which are many of the perpetrators of past
human rights violations which were sponsored directly or indirectly by
apartheid governments.
From October 1991 to October 1994, I headed the "Standing
Commission of Inquiry regarding Public Violence and Intimidation"
which was set up by the De Klerk government in terms of the Na-
tional Peace Accord of September 1991. Under that Accord, for the
first time the African National Congress and other liberation and
democratic organizations were party to the composition of an official
commission of inquiry. The Commission received the support of the
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major political parties. It also had the vocal support of the United
Nations and a number of its member states. It was able to throw light
on, and apportion blame for, many of the acts of serious violence
which accompanied the peace process. In particular, the Commission
uncovered third force activities from within the military and the na-
tional police. Yet, it did nothing more than scratch the surface.
There can be no doubt that in South Africa, what had the out-
ward appearance of tribal or political violence in many cases was the
result of provocation inspired by elements in the white dominated se-
curity forces. To his great credit, without the full and active support of
the former President de Klerk, my Commission could not have uncov-
ered what it did. Without government support, the substantial re-
sources required would simply not have been available to it.
The debate over a truth commission in South Africa came into
sharp focus in light of the closing words of the transitional constitu-
tion, under which the government is now ruling. It is there provided:
This Constitution provides an historic bridge between the past
of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, un-
told suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recogni-
tion of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and
development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective
of color, race, class, belief or sex. The pursuit of national unity,
the well-being of all South African citizens and peace require
reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the re-
construction of society. The adoption of this Constitution lays
the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to tran-
scend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross
violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian
principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt
and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that
there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need
for reparation but not for retaliation. In order to advance such
reconciliation and reconstruction amnesty shall be granted in re-
spect of acts, omissions and offenses associated with political
objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the
past. To this end Parliament ... shall adopt a law determining a
firm cut-off date, which shall be a date after 8 October 1990 and
before 6 December 1993, and providing for the mechanisms, cri-
teria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which
such amnesty should be dealt with at any time after the law has
been passed.
The government has now published the terms of legislation under
which a truth commission will be established. The legislation is due to
come before parliament during February 1995. It now has the sup-
port, not only of the African National Congress of President Mandela,
but also that of the National Party of Deputy President de Klerk. It is
to be called the "Commission for Truth Reconciliation." Unfortu-
nately, it remains anathema to the Inkatha Freedom Party of Mr.
Buthelezi, the white right wing Freedom Front and the security forces.
The legislation provides for a commission to be appointed by the
Government of National Unity. It will have three committees. One
to consider applications for amnesty by those confessing to have com-
mitted human rights abuses, whether from within the security forces
or the liberation movement. Amnesty will only be granted in respect
of offenses admitted by the persons applying for it.
A second committee will investigate past human rights abuses
committed between 1960 and 1993. Those investigations will be trig-
gered by information furnished to the Commission. Powers of sub-
poena and search and seizure are provided in the draft legislation.
The third committee will consider the payment of reparations by the
state to defined categories of victims.
Apart from the relevance of a truth and reconciliation commis-
sion for the victims of apartheid, in my opinion, a further vital conse-
quence could be the flushing out from office in the security forces
persons who were themselves guilty of serious human rights violations
or who collaborated with those who were so guilty. If that does not
happen, at least some of the undemocratic practices by which
apartheid laws were enforced are likely to continue. The new govern-
ment is likely to find itself compromised if it does not swiftly install a
clean, reliable, and loyal administration.
HI. The Lessons to be Learnt from Tuth Commissions
Many lessons can be learned from these experiences of national
commissions in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. The first and
most important is the deep need of victims for acknowledgement.
They cannot forget what has happened to them and cannot get on
with building the future until their calls for justice have been an-
swered. The worse the violations and the longer the time during
which they were committed, the louder are their calls. Forgiveness
cannot be granted without knowledge; and without forgiveness, there
cannot be any meaningful reconciliation. The only hope of breaking
cycles of violence is by public acknowledgement of such violence and
the exposure of those responsible for it. The other lesson is the dan-
ger of generalizing. A solution successful in one country may fail in
another. The correct approach to the past will depend upon a myriad
of political, economic, and cultural forces which all operate and inter-
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act with each other. However, to ignore or gloss over serious human
rights abuses is a dangerous enterprise and sooner or later a heavy
price will be paid by any society which allows that to happen.
IV. International Criminal Tribunals
Few human rights activists would have predicted that in 1993 and
1994 the Security Council of the United Nations would establish two
ad hoc international criminal tribunals-for the former Yugoslavia
and for Rwanda. It was widely believed by international lawyers that
such an international tribunal would only come into being by way of
treaty-a time-consuming procedure. Yet, the Security Council took
the short cut by using its wide powers under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter. The use of these powers depends on the
Council determining that there is a threat to international peace. An
important consequence of using Chapter VII is that the statutes creat-
ing the two tribunals are binding upon all member states. The Secur-
ity Council could take action, including the imposition of sanctions,
against members failing to comply with their provisions.
The creation of the "Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" was the
result of a number of factors. First, the abhorrence of a stunned world
at the implementation in the 1990s of a policy of "ethnic cleansing."
Second, the events that took place in Europe. And, third, access to
the atrocities by television cameras and journalists. Who can forget
the first dramatic and shocking photographs of the skin and bones of
camp inmates in Bosnia? And the first newspaper articles on the
crimes committed in the death camps of Prijedor? In the end, the
demands from human rights groups could not be resisted by the major
powers. The Security. Council resolutions on the Tribunal were
unanimous.
With hindsight, it was inevitable that bureaucratic delays would
accompany the establishment of a brand new kind of United Nations
organ. The first financial dispute related to whether the cost of the
Tribunal should be at the expense of the regular budget or the peace-
keeping budget-in other words, which countries should bear the
main financial burden. That dispute still remains unresolved. The
cost of staffing and housing the tribunal at the Hague was difficult to
estimate and also became the cause of delays.
The driving machine of the Tribunal is the Office of the Prosecu-
tor. Under the Tribunal Statute, the Prosecutor must be appointed by
the Security Council. It made such an appointment in September
1993-Mr. Ramon Escovar-Salom of Venezuela. He did not take up
office but resigned in February 1994 to become his country's Minister
of the Interior. It took another five months and eight rejected nomi-
nees, before my own appointment was approved by a unanimous Se-
curity Council. In the meantime, an Acting Deputy Prosecutor was
appointed-Graham Blewitt, who had been the head of the Austra-
lian War Crimes Unit. Mr. Blewitt proceeded with the difficult task of
recruiting and appointing a suitable international team of lawyers and
investigators. That is a task which cannot speedily be completed. Se-
nior appointees need to be interviewed. Successful applicants have to
make arrangements to be released from current commitments and be
relocated to the Hague.
The most difficult and important task with which my colleagues
and I were required to wrestle was that of establishing a prosecution
policy. We were faced with a mass of information including the
thousands of pages of allegations collected and collated by the Com-
mission of Experts which had been appointed by the Security Council
in October 1992, and reports from governments and international and
national nongovernmental organizations.
This first international tribunal clearly had not been established
in order to try the persons who were at the bottom of the chain of
command responsible for violations of international humanitarian
law. The Tribunal has two trial chambers and can try a relatively small
number of cases. It was determined, therefore, that we should indict
only those who were the most guilty and against whom sufficient relia-
ble evidence was available. And the evidence has to be sufficient not
only to give rise to a prima facie case, but sufficient to make it likely
that guilt will be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It was decided
further that having regard to the enormity of the offenses, the worst
known to humanity, the people who planned and ordered the commis-
sion of the crimes were more guilty than those who were ordered to
commit them.
The problem is that witnesses to the events and available docu-
mentary material concerning them are not sufficient to establish who
ordered them. A paper trail, such as that which assisted the prosecu-
tors at Nuremberg, has not been discovered in respect of the former
Yugoslavia. Collaborators have not come forward to inculpate their
peers, let alone their commanders. It was decided, therefore, initially
to investigate indictments against regional leaders who could be posi-
tively identified by victims and other eye witnesses.
In pursuance of that policy, ethnic cleansing in the region of
Prijedor became an early subject of inquiry. A leader of that region,
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identified by numerous witnesses, is Dusan Tadic. According to some
of the witnesses, Tadic collaborated in the ethnic cleansing of Prijedor
and the rapes, torture and murder of Muslim and other non-Serb
camp inmates. Tadic is being held in a German prison, having been
arrested and charged under German law with crimes against human-
ity. Because the crimes allegedly committed by Tadic were part of the
wider Prijedor investigation, in November 1994 I sought an order
from a trial chamber of the tribunal for the German courts to defer to
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The order was made and the surren-
der of Tadic will be requested after an indictment against him has
been issued and confirmed. Under the statute of the Tribunal, the
German government is obliged to comply with the order of the Tribu-
nal and, indeed, that government has acknowledged this.
The investigation by my office into the violations of international
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia is the most extensive crim-
inal investigation ever undertaken. It is made all the more difficult by
reason that the war has been ongoing in Bosnia. Because of the in-
crease in hostilities in October 1994, our investigators were compelled
to suspend one investigation and return to the Hague.
I would be surprised if people in high office in the former Yugo-
slavia are not now taking notice of the Tribunal and modifying their
conduct in consequence. Some unofficial reports support that
conclusion.
In light of the massive scale of murders which took place in
Rwanda between April and June 1994, the then new government of
Rwanda requested the Security Council to establish a second interna-
tional tribunal under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The
Security Council did so, although in the end Rwanda cast the only
negative vote. It did that not because it no longer sought the Tribunal,
but because of objections to some of the terms of the Tribunal Statute.
I am happy to say that during a visit to Rwanda in December 1994, I
was assured by the leaders of the country of the government's full
cooperation with the Tribunal.
In order to ensure consistency of procedures, practices and ap-
proaches between the two Tribunals, the Appeal Chamber of the Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia is also the Appeal Chamber for the
Rwanda Tribunal. For the same reason, I also was appointed as the
Prosecutor Rwanda.
The task of the Prosecutor in the case of Rwanda is less complex
than that in relation to the former Yugoslavia. Events in only one
country during one calendar year are involved and the perpetrators
are known. The evidence to establish their guilt must be sought. One
can immediately investigate the criminal conduct of the former re-
gime, many of the members of which have left Rwanda and are in
other African and some European countries. For that reason, in par-
ticular, it is appropriate that an international tribunal should have
been established. Without one, there is a greater likelihood that the
perpetrators of a genocide would not be brought to justice.
The Rwandan government's top priority is to enable the approxi-
mately two million refugees in Zaire, Burundi, Kenya and elsewhere
to return to their homes. And correctly so, for they a constitute a
threat to Rwanda's security. To achieve that goal, the government
recognizes the necessity for Rwanda's own courts to try and punish
those former leaders and their collaborators who have not left
Rwanda. In my opinion, it is of crucial importance that the United
Nations and the international community should also assist Rwanda to
rebuild its justice system which, at present, is practically non-existent.
Important initiatives to do so are already in progress.
V. Conclusion
Whether justice is done nationally or internationally, the benefits
and goals are similar. Indeed the acknowledgement of grave viola-
tions of human rights from an international tribunal is calculated to
mean even more to victims than one from a municipal court or com-
mission. The major difference, however, lies in the field of deterrence.
As I have already suggested, the fact that the Security Council has
been prepared to use Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to
establish ad hoc criminal tribunals must send a clear message to
would-be violators in other parts of the world that they may not get
away with grave violations of international humanitarian law. They
may be brought to account if they set foot outside their own country.
For that is the effect of the procedures adopted by the Tribunals.
Although no trials will be held in the absence of the accused, the
nonappearance before the Tribunal of an accused person has serious
consequences. In particular, on the basis of evidence led before a trial
chamber, the indictment of the Prosecutor can be reconfirmed by the
panel of the judges. If they do so, they will issue an international war-
rant of arrest for transmission to Interpol. And, if the nonappearance
is the consequence of a default by a state member of the United Na-
tions, that would be reported by the President of the Tribunal to the
Security Council. It, in turn, would be entitled to adopt measures,
including sanctions, against the recalcitrant government. In effect, an
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accused person will have been publicly labelled as a potential war
criminal and made liable to arrest in virtually every country of the
world-not an enviable position and one in which it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to hold high public office in her or his own country.
In both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda there have been cy-
cles of violence for many decades. The violations became more and
more egregious. If international justice can break those cycles of vio-
lence and allow the people of those countries to become reconciled,
then an important new peacekeeping initiative will have been taken.
A procedure holding out tremendous hope for many other countries.
A hope, too, that a permanent international criminal court will at long
last be set up and thereby make international humanitarian law a liv-
ing and effective bulwark against the most horrible crimes known to
humanity.
Any country ignores grave violations of human rights at its peril.
The larger the number of victims, the greater the risk of hatred and
revenge becoming a cancer which will lead sooner or later to civil
strife. The manner in which the violations are handled, whether per-
petrators are punished, lose office, or are granted indemnities are is-
sues which will depend on political considerations which will differ
from country to country. Whatever the solution, the international
community does have a direct interest. That is the consequence of the
recognition since the Second World War of crimes against humanity.
That is the moral and legal underpinning for international criminal
justice. The international community has an additional interest in that
internal civil strife invariably has serious consequences for neighbor-
ing countries and especially so in respect of refugees.
Justice is very much a part of a peace process. It will often be
spurned and avoided by political leaders who were themselves guilty
in the past. However, it is in the interests of international peace that
crimes against humanity are properly investigated and punished-
whether by national or international courts. Acknowledgement of
what happened to the victims is not only morally desirable-it can be
an effective insurance against the repetition of those violations in the
future.
We are now on the threshold of a new era in the development of
international humanitarian law. It needs the support and encourage-
ment of all moral and rational people in every country of the world.
At the end of the Second World War, the international community
said, "Never again," and with that resolve the United Nations was es-
tablished. But it has happened again and again on four continents.
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There is only one means of ensuring that genocides and crimes against
humanity will cease, and that is by having an effective and efficient
deterrent-the punishment of those who abuse power, especially state
power, against innocent men, women, and children. In short, interna-
tional humanitarian law must not remain purely an aspiration. It must
become an enforceable and universal reality.

